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A large number of rallies have been held in Germany over recent months by the ‘Pegida’ movement
(Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West). Nitzan Shoshan notes that while Pegida
have made headlines across the world, they are by no means the ﬁrst far-right movement in
Germany to protest against immigration and Islam. He writes that the experiences of previous far-
right groups provide some insights on the potential harm that such movements can cause in local
communities.
While commentators have warned of a potential hike in Islamophobic currents across Europe
following the terror attacks in Paris earlier this month, and while critics have condemned as dangerous and cynically
manipulative the rhetorical uses to which far right leaders such as the UK Independence Party’s Nigel Farage or
Marine Le Pen of France’s Front National have put the assassinations, observers of European politics will rightly
note that, throughout the continent, anti-Islamic and anti-immigration xenophobia hardly stood in need of a helping
hand. Quite the contrary, both Farage and Le Pen have scored signiﬁcant electoral gains in recent years, and
immigration, particularly – if far from exclusively – of Muslims, has for quite some time established itself as the
central and unifying theme of a European far right that seems to agree on little else besides.
European patriots
Perhaps nowhere in Europe has Islamophobia occupied as predominant a place in public debates over the past
year as in Germany, where the steady ascent of the Dresden-based movement Patriotic Europeans Against the
Islamisation of the West (or Pegida, following its acronym in German) has forced even the ﬁrmly conservative
Angela Merkel to repeat, in her recent New Year’s speech, former president Christian Wulﬀ’s controversial statement
that Islam is part of Germany.
Founded by the self-described “foreigner friendly” Lutz Bachmann, who has withdrawn from the public limelight
(though not from key organisational activities) following the exposure of his past criminal convictions for burglary and
drug related oﬀences, Pegida has consistently shunned the media, befuddled the experts, and frustrated political
leaders. Some understand the movement as a pressure-valve for airing a range of resentments, while others see in
it the contemporary prevalence of “culture wars” discourses. North Rhine-Westphalia Social Democrat Minister of
Internal Aﬀairs Ralf Jäger drew ﬁre for describing Pegida followers as neo-Nazis, while Federal Finance Minister
Christian Democrat Wolfgang Schäuble attributed the movement’s success to the demographic rise of ﬁnancially-
secure retirees who have nothing better to worry about in their free time.
The Pegida movement has generated a number of counter-protests; Image credit: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Nordrhein-Westfalen (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
Aside from the evident diversity of its sympathisers – many, though by no means all, of whom apparently have no
previous involvement with far right (or any) political activism – some of the confusion probably owes to Pegida’s
manifesto. Among its 19 points, the document aﬃrms the right of asylum, calls for better integration of and improved
counseling for refugees, supports sexual diversity, and condemns hate speech; all starkly untypical positions for the
German far right.
But most observers rightly pay little or no heed to the document, which contrasts sharply with the blatantly anti-
refugee and anti-immigration language of both speakers and attendants at weekly demonstrations in Dresden and
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elsewhere, whose turnouts have shot up from a few
hundreds in October to approximately 25,000 (40,000
according to the organisers) most recently; not to mention
the explicitly xenophobic nationalism that Pegida leaders
have allegedly expressed in internal online forums. A
burgeoning anti-Pegida movement has taken to the
streets in a number of German cities, most forcefully on
12 January, to protest against racism and Islamophobia.
A crowded ﬁeld
And yet, its current dominance in media coverage
notwithstanding, the three-month young Pegida entered
an already rather crowded political arena of Islamophobic
racism and xenophobic nationalism. The last year has
witnessed a marked rise in demonstrations against
asylum seeker shelters in numerous German cities, while
violent attacks against existing shelters have similarly skyrocketed. Earlier this month in Dresden, under the shadow
of regular Pegida marches, local resident groups successfully pressured a hotel owner to scrap the imminent
conversion of his property into residence for asylum seekers.
For some two years now, marches protesting against the construction of residences for asylum seekers have
regularly taken to the streets of Berlin’s district of Marzahn-Hellersdorf. Against the hopes of their local political
opponents, far from petering out, the demonstrations – led by the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of
Germany (NPD) – have instead progressively augmented both their frequency and their attendance. The crowds at
such events appear to comprise a relatively high proportion of visually identiﬁable soccer hooligans, neo-Nazis, and
NPD supporters, though many, too, describe themselves as concerned local neighbours and display no visible signs
of political belonging. The rhetoric, with its thinly veiled racism and its indignant condemnation of asylum fraud and
immigrant criminality, is scarcely distinguishable from what one hears at Pegida demonstrations.
The considerably less civil Hooligans against Salaﬁsts (HoGeSa), with multiple links to a number of local anti-
refugee movements as well as to militant neo-Nazi groupings, abruptly broke into the headlines last October
following a spectacularly violent demonstration that paralysed Cologne’s central train station area, where an
estimated 5,000-strong mob overwhelmed a far outnumbered police force, injuring dozens of oﬃcers.
Incomparably more urbane and diﬃcult to locate on the political map is the current Wunderkind of German electoral
politics, the Eurosceptic, culturally conservative, and economically liberal party Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Emboldened by a series of surprising successes at the polls, most notably in last year’s European Parliament
elections, the AfD has focused on reclaiming economic and ﬁscal sovereignty and has emphatically rejected
accusations of anti-immigrant xenophobia. Nevertheless, its chair Bernd Lucke has recently expressed sympathy for
Pegida and, even as his second-in-command Hans-Olaf Henkel exhorted against the possibly racist nature of the
anti-Islamic movement, AfD supporters and activists have evidently attended its demonstrations. Arguably more
compromising for the party’s attempt to maintain a respectable image is the fact that AfD’s state-level electoral gains
appear to correlate with electoral losses for the NPD.
Looking nice
While the Hooligans of HoGeSa, the neo-Nazis of the NPD, and other militant nationalists continue to thrive in
certain German settings, emergent xenophobic movements on the far right today struggle for what Germans call
Salonfähigkeit and can roughly be translated as social acceptability or presentability. Entrepreneurs in Dresden
sweat over the potential harm that movements like Pegida could spell for the city’s high-tech ﬁrms, for its tourism
industry, and for its institutions of higher education; much as the leaders of such movements work hard to produce
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and protect their reputation as moderate and upright.
But perhaps the distinction between what is and what is not Salonfähig is a false one. The two appear rather to feed
on each other, enable each other, and shape each other reciprocally. The fatal saga of the National Socialist
Underground (NSU), whose intricate details have unfolded over the past few years in courts and special
parliamentary committees at the Federal and state levels, illustrates this comfortable symbiosis with horrifying
lucidity.
The NSU terrorist trio, which committed a series of execution-style racist assassinations and numerous armed bank
robberies, no doubt belonged with the most militant and violent fringes of German nationalism. As the hearings
startlingly revealed, however, its capacity to carry on with its cold-blooded killings for over a decade owed a great
deal to normalised racism in the state’s law enforcement and intelligence institutions. With a wealth of information at
their disposal, police and intelligence agencies repeatedly brushed oﬀ numerous clues that suggested the
perpetrators were neo-Nazis. Instead, and despite the absence of any supporting evidence, they continued to
search for the murderers among immigrant communities, eﬀectively criminalising the families and acquaintances of
the victims.
In a similar vein, perhaps the adamant insistence of Pegida’s leaders on the movement’s nonviolent ways is beside
the point. It is too early to determine whether participants in the latest march of 12 January in Dresden had anything
to do with the deadly stabbing of an Eritrean asylum seeker, sometime between that evening and the following
morning. But, whether or not they and others succeed in branding themselves as reasonable patriots, history
suggests that their Islamophobic discourse will not fail to produce more dead bodies in Germany and elsewhere.
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